

Covert Channels and Machine Learning Traffic Classification

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Who am I?




- Research Fellow at CAIA
- Previously
 - Scientist at Fraunhofer FOKUS (Germany)
 - PhD student at CAIA
- Research interests: traffic classification, covert channels, network performance measurements
- Co-author of 30+ peer-reviewed papers, 2 IETF RFCs
- Collaborators: Grenville Armitage, Philip Branch, Steven Murdoch (Uni. Cambridge), Tanja Zseby (Fraunhofer FOKUS), Georg Carle (Tech. Uni. Munich), Benoit Claise (Cisco), ...

Covert Channels




- Encryption protects content of communication
- Existence of communication enough to take actions
- Covert channels **hide existence of communication**
- Potential users
 - Gov. agencies or criminals hiding communication
 - Hackers or spies ex-filtrating data
 - Users circumventing censorship or bypassing firewalls



Noisy Covert Channels




- Many simple **noise-free** channels, e.g. unused bits...
 - ▶ Easy to detect and eliminate by security systems
- More complex channels are **noisy**
- Selected channels: IP Time-to-Live field, packet timing, games / virtual worlds, temperature-based
- Investigate noise characteristics, capacity, encoding schemes, countermeasures



Covert Channels Findings




- Bit error rates up to 1–10% and bit sync. errors
- Capacity up to a few hundreds bits/second
- Sufficient for sending short messages, documents
- Some channels easy to detect but hard to eliminate and vice versa
- Machine Learning detects some channels with $> 95\%$



Machine-Learning Traffic Classification




- Port numbers unreliable (NATs, proxies, obfuscation)
- Payload inspection is limited (encryption, privacy)
 - ▶ Traffic features, e. g. packet length
 - ▶ Machine Learning (ML) feature-based classification
- ML too costly for low-end home DSL/Cable routers
 - ▶ Separate flow classification and treatment






- Distributed Firewall and Flow-shaper Using Statistical Evidence (**DIFFUSE**)
- Funded by **Cisco University Research Program**
- 12 month project started in June 2010
- Successor of 2005/2006 URP project
- Develop open-source prototype based on existing IPFW firewall
- Analyse classifier speed, accuracy, stability



DIFFUSE Architecture



- **Classifier Nodes** (CNs) classify flows
- **Action Nodes** (ANs) treat flows based on class
- CNs control ANs via control protocol
- Extended rule language used to configure CNs, ANs




DIFFUSE Applications



- Automated QoS provision for interactive traffic
- Lawful Interception
- Detection and blocking malicious traffic

C ClassifierNode

A ActionNode



The End



Questions???